Fiscal decentralisation and gender responsive budgeting in South Africa: An appraisal. by Chakraborty, Lekha S. & Bagchi, Amaresh
2
Fiscal  Fiscal Decentralisation and Decentralisation and
Gender Responsive Budgeting Gender Responsive Budgeting




Fiscal  Fiscal Decentralisation and Decentralisation and
Gender Responsive Budgeting Gender Responsive Budgeting






South Africa has been a pioneer in gender budgeting.
Launched in 1995, it was the initiative of the post-apartheid regime,
which took over the administration of the country in 1994. What
distinguishes South African gender budgeting from that of other
countries is the interface between racial discrimination and gender
inequalities.
Understandably, race constitutes an important focus of
attention in the policy arena in a country, where 79 percent of the
46.9 million people are Africans.
1  Public policy on gender cannot be
built on the homogeneity assumption that all women are equal
especially in a country where the overwhelming majority of the
female population is African. It was felt that the dimension of race
had to be recognised in gender budgeting as well, otherwise the main
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victims of oppression and discrimination viz., black women did not
benefit to any appreciable extent.  Thus emphasis moved away from
the narrowly conceived gender budgeting with emphasis on budget
allocations for women at the national level to affirmative actions
through legislation to end discrimination against the blacks in general
with special attention to women.  Further, allocations in public
expenditure having potential for benefiting women were sought to be
provided more at levels of government closer to the people i.e.,
through decentralisation.
2  In all these initiatives, gender figured as
the focus of attention with race. This paper seeks to provide an
overview of gender budgeting initiatives within the framework of
decentralisation process in South Africa, keeping these perspectives
in view.
The paper has six sections. Apart from the introduction,
section 2 critically evaluates the initiatives on gender budgeting in
South Africa at national and subnational levels. Section 3 looks into
the fiscal decentralisation process through a gender lens. Sections 4
and 5 deals with the budgetary process and the governance
mechanisms at the local level to identify the entry points for gender.
Section 6 draws and summarises conclusions.
II. Gender Budgeting Initiatives in South Africa
Gender budget initiatives began in South Africa, immediately
after the Beijing UN Conference on Women, 1995 as a collaborative
venture of women parliamentarians and non-governmental
organisations,
3 known as Women’s Budget Initiative (WBI).  WBI
emphasised that the solution to gender discrimination is
mainstreaming gender issues rather than implementing separate
women’s programmes and policies. It is to be noted that
mainstreaming gender in budget is comparatively a better approach
rather than quota-based gender budgeting (of earmarking a specific
proportion of each sectoral budget for women, as in the case of
Philippines), which is confined to a very negligible part of the budget.
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Further, gender budgeting initiatives in South Africa focussed
more on reprioritisation of programmes rather than increasing the
budgetary allocation for women. This is against the backdrop of
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macropolicy in
1997, which emphasised the hard budget constraints. Moreover,
though the environment was more favourable towards gender
equality with the adoption of the final constitution in South Africa in5
1997 as also the development of machinery to oversee
implementation of measures with gender focus, such as Office of
Status of Women (OSW) and Commission of Gender Equality
(CGE)), the gender focal points created within the government were
engaged more in redressing gender imbalances among the elite of
the civil service rather than attending to the needs of poor and needy
women. However, the advantage of civil society (outside
government) initiative of WBI in South Africa is the participatory,
grassroot initiatives by the civil society to provide economic literacy
among ordinary people and demystify budgets through the
publication of simple budget (sectoral) booklets through a gender
lens.
5  The drawback of the WBI is that it failed to institutionalise
gender budget within government in South Africa. The sustainability
of gender budgeting initiatives in South Africa will depend to a great
extent in creating a synergy between civil society and government, in
particular with experts in the budget division of Department of
Finance to strengthen the public finance lens of gender budgeting.
A within government initiative on gender budgeting began in
1998 with the establishment of a women’s pilot budget within
Department of Finance. However, this was primarily a donor driven
initiative by the Commonwealth Secretariat, which lasted for only two
years. This resulted in the inclusion of certain case studies of gender
issues within the compilation of sectoral reports tabled on Budget
Day in 1999. Since 1999, the initiative has been discontinued by the
Department of Finance. However, in the absence of any study in this
regard, what has been the impact of these initiatives in terms of
gender indicators is not known.
WBI took the gender budgeting initiatives to local level for the
first time in 1999, though local governments were then in transition in
terms of realigning the country from the racially segregated units of
the apartheid regime. This was more challenging because of the
difficulty in analysing the local government budgets through a gender
lens as most local government services were directed to the
households and not women members of households, as such. WBI
tended to focus on the poor and the way local government budgets
impacted them. Revenue decentralisation was one of the core thrusts
of WBI in the following two years as attention was drawn to the
issues related to fiscal autonomy at subnational levels. However, the
within government initiative at local government on gender budgeting
is almost invisible in South Africa, except in the province of Gauteng.
An attempt was made in Gauteng to incorporate gender elements in
its budget to which we turn in the section on budgetary process.6
As mentioned, though there are no direct initiatives on
gender budgeting within government at the national level, several
windows have been opened for affirmative action in South Africa in
terms of gender, especially through legislations like the Employment
Equity Act, Promotion of Equality Act and Black Economic
Empowerment Act (BEE). The Employment Equity Act, 1998
envisages non-discrimination coupled with positive measures of
discrimination to accelerate women’s access to employment
opportunities and benefits. The provisions of this Act envisage
enforcement through the labour court system, labour inspections, and
broad monitoring by a statutory body, viz., Commission of
Employment Equity (CEE). The Act also addresses issues such as
pregnancy discrimination, sexual and other forms of harassment,
discrimination on grounds of HIV and AIDS status, discrimination on
grounds of family responsibility, pregnancy discrimination and
discrimination on grounds of disability, including failure to provide
reasonable accommodation (Beijing Plus Ten Report, South Africa,
2005).
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act, 2000, provides a comprehensive legal framework
for the prohibition of discrimination, redressal for discrimination,
progressive eradication of discrimination, and promotion of equality.
The core of enforcement mechanism has the specialised equality
courts. At least 60 equality courts have been established to provide
relief to claimants in magistrate courts throughout the country. The
government has made a conscious decision to prioritise the
advancement of women along with people with disabilities, workers,
and rural communities in programmes or activities that are designed
to undo the legacy of apartheid in the matter of participation by the
black community in the economy. This policy commitment is reflected
in the key national instruments that regulate BEE. These include the
Broad-based BEE, 2003 (Act 53 of 2003), and the Draft codes of
Good Practice on BEE. The National Policy Framework on Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment mandates the establishment of
a regular monitoring mechanism through JMC (Joint Monitoring
Committee) of Parliament to ensure that gender considerations are
included in all legislations.
Despite these legislations and affirmative actions, within
each racial group, inequalities persisted significantly. An important
dimension of the interface between racial discrimination and gender
inequalities in South Africa has been intra-racial income inequalities.
If we decompose inequality into within-group and between-group
components using the Theil-T, empirical evidence showed that 407
percent of inequality is owing to between-race inequality, 33 percent
on account of intra-African inequality and 21 percent due to intra-
White inequality (Ingrid, 2002).  The point to be noted here is that
affirmative action in South Africa continues to be shaped solely
around racial identities, which ignores intra-racial inequalities, which
is one of the emerging criteria of social differentiation in the country.
In spite of the Employment Equity Act, which is aimed at
improving prospects for historically disadvantaged employees, black
women continue to face economic disadvantage. Labour Force
Survey (2003) revealed that African women faced high rates of
unemployment compared to other groups and especially in
comparison to white men and women. The unemployment rate was
as high as 55 percent as compared to 10 percent among white
women and 6 percent among white men (Table 1).









active 5,567,000 877,000 781,000 3,825,000 506,000 416,000
Employed 3,556,000 840,000 855,000 4,405,000 1,024,000 1,104,000
Unemployed 4,284,000 383,000 92,000 3,200,000 318,000 67,000
Total 13,408,000 2,100,000 1,728,000 11,430,000 1,848,000 1,588,000
Unemployment
rate (in %) 55 31 10 42 24 6
Employment as
% of adult
population 27 40 49 39 55 70
Source: (Basic Data) Labour Force Survey, 2003. Statistics South Africa in Neva Seidman
Makgetla, 2004
This disadvantaged position of black women can be
attributed to discrimination in education, hiring and promotion and to
the unequal division of labour in the household (Flood, Primo, and
Kadalie, 1997). Data on incomes by race and gender revealed that in
2003 almost two thirds of black women earned under R1000 a
month, compared to 3 percent of white men (Table 2).8
Table 2: Incomes by Race and Gender, 2003 (in percent)
Women Men





Up to R1000 64 31 5 40 23 3
R1001 to R2500 18 32 14 35 30 8
R2501 to R4500 9 19 27 15 23 14
R4501 to R8000 9 17 42 9 20 47
Over R8000 1 2 11 2 5 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: (Basic Data) Labour Force Survey, 2003. Statistics South Africa in Neva
Seidman Makgetla, 2004
Empirical evidence also revealed that in the name of BEE,
many firms in South Africa were engaged in window-dressing,
recruiting blacks to give the firm an artificial black empowerment
profile, but attempted to exploit and circumvent empowerment
regulations out of reluctance to transfer economic power to black
people (Engdahl and Hanks, 2001). It is also noted that there exists a
debate in South Africa whether introduction of sunset clause in
affirmative actions — it refers to the termination of affirmative action,
either be set by a timeframe or be linked to the achievements of
certain goals — could be more effective.
It is increasingly realised that the benefits of affirmative
action and legislations against racial discrimination is confined to only
the elite within the racial groups.  Evidences revealed that reforms
through legal fiat are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
removing or alleviating the racial and gender inequalities in the post-
apartheid regime are created. The mainstreaming of the
disadvantaged women in the racial groups to the economy needs
more effective policies to redress their capability deprivation through
improving their access to physical and social infrastructure than just
better enforcement of legislative measures and affirmative action.
Effective fiscal decentralisation has a significant role to play
in improving the access of women to the basic infrastructure and
public service delivery. At the subnational level, with increasing
decentralisation, there is good scope for initiatives on gender
budgeting; the rationale being that merit goods like education and
health are the responsibility of provincial government and the
provisioning of quasi-public goods like, water supply which is of
crucial importance for women, is the responsibility of local
governments.  However, there is no meaningful decentralisation at
the provincial level, as the revenue powers of provinces are
negligible. In the section that follows, we take a look at the process of
fiscal decentralisation and the process of budgeting at subnational9
government, mainly local government, in South Africa through a
gender lens.
III. Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa through a Gender
Lens
South Africa has a unitary system of governance, but, in
practice, it is highly decentralised with three tiers of government. It
has, besides the national government, nine provinces and 284 local
governments. In the reorganisation of sub-national units of
government, race has been an important consideration rather than
fiscal imperatives. In the post-apartheid era, four white provinces and
nine black homelands were reorganised into nine provinces; while
843 transitional municipalities were consolidated into 284 local
governments by combining the black and white areas. There are,
however, no rural local bodies unlike panchayats in India.
3.1 Assignment of Functions and Finance
The constitution assigns revenue powers and functions to
the three levels of government (Table 3). The asymmetry between
the revenue powers and expenditure functions across the tiers of
government have made provinces and local governments dependent
in varying degrees on transfers from national government flowing
through a revenue sharing model.
In terms of revenue assignment, local governments — all
municipalities — have access to some substantial tax powers unlike
the provinces.  While the national government is vested with all
broad-based taxes such as income tax, corporation tax, VAT,
excises, fuel levy, and customs, constituting around 80 percent of
total revenues, sources of revenue for provinces are very few and
insignificant. These include gambling taxes (betting tax on casino and
horse race), motor car license fees, and user fees on hospital
services. In 2002, revenue from these sources constituted only 1.32
percent of the total revenues of the government.10
Table 3: Assignment of Functions and Financial Powers to Different Levels of Government
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Table 3: Assignment of Functions and Financial Powers to Different Levels of Govt. (contd.)




































Note: * refers to concurrent assignments.
Source:  Rao (2003), and Momoniat (2002).12
The own sources of revenue of local governments are
property taxes, turnover/pay roll regional levies on businesses and
user charges on electricity and water, constituting a little over 20
percent of the total government revenue (Table 3). At the same time,
various expenditure functions are assigned to provincial and local
governments. Provinces are able to finance only 3.2 percent of their
expenditure functions from own revenue sources; while 78.8 percent
of the expenditure functions are covered by own revenue sources at
the local level.
3.2 Intergovernmental Transfers
In regard to revenue sharing, South Africa’s Constitution
specifies that provincial and local governments are entitled to an
equitable share of nationally raised revenue (section 214).
6
Accordingly, since 1998 certain shares of national revenues (after
national debt servicing needs and contingency reserve for
emergencies) have been allocated to subnational governments as
their "equitable share".
Table 4: Revenue Transfers-headwise, 2005/06 – 2008/09 (in percent)
Revised Medium term estimates
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
National 37.6 36.6 36.3 35.9
Provincial, of which 57.6 57.0 57.2 57.4
Equitable shares 37.2 36.1 36.5 37.0
Conditional grants 20.5 20.9 20.7 20.4
Local 4.8 6.5 6.5 6.6
Total 100 100.0 100 100
Source: Medium Term Budget Policy Statement, 2005, page 53
As per the latest estimates, provincial governments receive
37.2 percent of national revenue as equitable share while local
governments receive 4.8 percent of the national revenue (Medium
Term Budget Policy Statement, 2005). The division of revenue is
made for three years under the multi-year budgeting system in South
Africa. The estimates of recent division of revenue are given in Table
4.
3.2.1 Transfers to provinces
The Provincial Equitable Share, (PES), an unconditional
grant, constitutes the major fiscal transfer to provinces. There are
some conditional grants, however. PES is based on a formula
consisting of seven components. The formula has relatively high13
weights for education, health and welfare; in addition, the formula
contains backlog and economic activity components.
The devolution formula of PES is significant in incorporating
efficiency and equity in the provision of public services in South
Africa. However, as already noted, the transfer formula has been
revised recently taking out the welfare and backlog components. The
current and revised formulae
7 are given in Table 5. The weights
assigned to each component are broadly based on expenditures
incurred in the past. Provinces have the discretion to spend PES
according to their own priorities as it is an unconditional transfer and
thus fully fungible.
Table 5: The Provincial Equitable Sharing (PES) System




Education (i)   Enrolment
(ii)  Children in the school age group 6-17
41 51
Health (i) Population covered by medical aid support
(ii) Population without the medical aid support
19 26
Welfare (i) Transfer payments to identified groups—
elderly, disabled, children.
 Population in the lowest two quintiles of
income distribution.
18 -
Basic  Share of total population of the country. 7 14
Economic
Activity
Share of remuneration of employees based on
Gross Domestic Product per Region(GDPR)data
7 1
Backlogs Capital (backlogs) needs in education and
health. Also includes a ruralness factor.
3 -
Institutional Fixed costs associated with establishing
institutions for provincial governments and




Source: Budget Review, 2005 ; Finance and Fiscal Commission (2004) and Western
Cape Medium Term Budget, 2005-2008
In addition to PES, Provincial expenditures are financed
through conditional transfers. Table 6 sets out the total transfers,
both equitable share and conditional grants, to provinces in 2005-06.
The equitable share constitutes 64.4 percent of the total grants.
Social Development conditional grants make up the largest share of
conditional grants.  This is because of the revision in PES formula
that welfare component (social security grants) should be removed
from the formula and the function be converted into a conditional
grant or any other appropriate funding mechanism while the issue of
the National Social Security Agency is addressed (Budget Review,
2005).14










Eastern Cape 22202 848 675 581 10705 276 13085 35287
Free State 8660 759 221 408 4015 88 5491 14151
Gauteng 20810 2547 370 1345 6852 120 11234 32044
KwaZulu-Natal 28399 1315 788 800 12865 287 16055 44454
Limpopo 18376 522 661 399 7385 238 9205 27581
Mpumalanga 9976 257 286 321 3826 112 4802 14778
Northern Cape 3124 249 181 80 1345 45 1900 5024
North West 11086 353 321 468 4674 131 5947 17033
Western Cape 12072 1815 229 466 4265 74 6849 18921
Total 134705 8665 3732 4868 55932 1371 74568 209273
% Share 64.4 4.1 1.8 2.3 26.7 0.7 35.6 100
Source: Budget Review, 2005, page 14715
3.2.2 Transfers to local governments
The local governments receive Local Equitable Share (LES)
and a few conditional grants as fiscal transfers from national
government. LES is intended primarily to assist poor households that
are unable to pay for the services that are delivered by the
municipality, as may be seen from the components and weights
presented in Table 7.
The revision of LES is under consideration to improve the
components for basic services and institutional arrangements, better
reflect the revenue-raising capacity (RRC) of municipalities, update
the cost of basic services package to poor households for the first
time since 1998 and take greater account of the level of services
actually provided by municipalities. This is particularly significant in
the context of local governments of South Africa, mandated by the
constitution (Section 153a) to provide a significant number of
services, some of which are their responsibility and others are
concurrent with the other spheres of government.
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Protection of local bodies
from negative shocks due
to changes in formula
Sum of the formula
determined S and I grants or
previous years allocation
18.6
Total S + I + R + N + B + E + M 100.0
Source: Submission for the division of revenue 2005/06, Financial and Fiscal
Commission (2004).16
Apart from Local Equitable Share (LES) and the water
operating subsidy, there are two more transfers to local government
which are conditional in nature; viz., infrastructure grants and
capacity building, and restructuring grants.  Table 7 gives the
components of national transfers to local governments. The
unconditional LES component constitutes 56 percent of national
transfers in 2005-06. The establishment of Municipal Infrastructure
Grant is a major step forward in the process of conditional grants; as
it rationalises a large number of grants to local government for
infrastructure. LES supplements local governments own revenue to
deliver free basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity and
refuse removal to poor households. While there are large variations
among municipalities, on average, nearly 86 percent of local
government revenue comes from their own revenue sources like
property taxes, regional service council levies, user charges and
borrowing (Budget Review, 2005).
Table 8: Total Transfers to Local Government (in percent)
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Equitable share and related 58.45 61.64 58.38 57.83
Equitable share and related 52.03 56.19 53.35 52.98
Water and sanitation operating 6.43 5.44 5.03 4.85
Infrastructure 36.34 33.99 37.82 38.68
Current transfers 5.20 4.36 3.80 3.49
Total 100 100 100 100
Total transfers (R million) 14757 17160 19708 21461
  Source: Budget Review, 2005
The ‘cost norms’ approach of FFC to determine the equitable
shares is criticised on the ground that it takes into account only the
estimates of expenditure needs for the assigned functions and does
not consider the revenue equalisation requirements in the transfer
system. Paucity of information on various factors influencing
expenditure needs of all seven components in the PES formula and
methodological improvement in estimating expenditure needs also
constitute limitations of FFC method (Rao, 2003).  Moreover, in the
case of provinces, revenue equalisation in the transfer formula is
meaningful only when some broad-based tax handles are assigned
to provinces rather than the current gambling taxes and hospital
services.
9
3.3 Gender in Fiscal Decentralisation
Absence of significant fiscal autonomy of provinces is an odd
feature of South Africa’s decentralisation system. This looks17
particularly surprising since provinces are responsible for the
implementation of the most important social services, including
school education, health (including academic and regional hospitals,
as well as primary health care) and housing. Moreover, all these
have significant implications in terms of gender, when it comes to
public service delivery.
In the health care provisioning, the biggest challenge in
South Africa is with regard to the HIV epidemics, the most severe in
the world. By the end of 2005, there were 5.5 million people living
with HIV in South Africa, and almost 1,000 AIDS deaths occurring
every day (UNAIDS 2006). Based on its sample of more than 16,000
women attending antenatal clinics across all nine provinces, the
South African Department of Health Study estimates that 29.5
percent of pregnant women were living with HIV in 2004. The
provinces which recorded the highest HIV rates were KwaZulu-Natal,
Gauteng and Mpumalanga (Table 9).
Table 9: Estimated HIV Prevalence among Antenatal Clinic
















KwaZulu-Natal 36.2 33.5 36.5 37.5 40.7
Gauteng 29.4 29.8 31.6 29.6 33.1
Mpumalanga 29.7 29.2 28.6 32.6 30.8
Free State 27.9 30.1 28.8 30.1 29.5
Eastern Cape 20.2 21.7 23.6 27.1 28.0
North West 22.9 25.2 26.2 29.9 26.7
Limpopo 13.2 14.5 15.6 17.5 19.3
Northern Cape 11.2 15.9 15.1 16.7 17.6
Western Cape 8.7 8.6 12.4 13.1 15.4
National 24.5 24.8 26.5 27.9 29.5
Source: Department of Health, South Africa, 2004
Empirical evidence also revealed that HIV/AIDS pandemic
has increased the time spent by women in the care economy. Health
policy in South Africa is yet to recognise the care providers of AIDS
patients in the unpaid economy. In other words, health issues of
women not only as users of services, but also providers of health
services, both at community level and household level, need
adequate attention in the macropolicies related to health sector.
Much of the added labour in the care economy could have been
lessened if people with AIDS had access to anti-retrovirals (ARV) in
public health care provisioning by the provincial governments, which
permit most to remain healthy for much longer. It is noted that ARV18
treatment is accessible to only a small minority of South Africans who
can afford private healthcare. The point to be noted here is that the
cost of providing treatment in public health care and preventive
education could eventually be less expensive than the economic
impact of an unchecked AIDS epidemic.
Yet another instance is with regard to the public provisioning
of housing and its gender specific impacts. The myopic policies
related to public provisioning of housing away from basic amenities of
life have increased the time spent by women in the care economy. As
noted in Table 10, subsidised housing in the urban areas of South
Africa was substantially distant from basic amenities, including
clinics, schools, and welfare offices.
Table 10: Distance of Urban Subsidised Housing From
Amenities, 2003 (in percent)






















































Source: (Basic Data) Labour Force Survey, 2003. Statistics South Africa in Neva
Seidman Makgetla, 2004
Apart from provincial governments, the local governments
are also entrusted with the provisioning of many of the quasi-public
goods and user services including power and water, which have
gender dimensions. Public infrastructure deficit or poor provisioning
of quasi-public good in the rural areas may accentuate rural poverty
as the time allocation across gender is skewed towards unpaid SNA
work like fetching of water, which is otherwise available for income-
earning market economy activities.
Public investment in infrastructure like water can have
positive social externalities in terms of sparing the girls from the duty
of fetching water, enabling them to go to school and improving the
health and nutrition of households. Studies have found that easy
access to drinking water facilities lead to an increase in school
enrolment, particularly girls. Time use statistics provide valuable
insights in terms of gender in expenditure assignments, which
otherwise appear to be non-rival in nature. For instance, the time use19
data conducted in South Africa revealed that of the people without
access to water on sites, a larger proportion of female than male
members of the household are likely to be involved in water collection
(Chart 1). The gender differentials in the likelihood of members being
involved is smallest when water is less than 100 metres from the
dwelling, and the largest when water is at a distance of a kilometer or
more. Female members of the household are almost three times as
likely as male members to collect water, when water source is far
away.
Analysis of time use statistics revealed that the average time
per day spent collecting water increases from 44 minutes for
collectors living in households within 100 meters of the water source,
to 71 minutes per day for households at a distance of a kilometre or
more from the source (Statistics South Africa, 2002). Public
investment in water and delivery mechanism of water has serious
implications in terms of time use and unpaid work burden of women.
However, functional autonomy at subnational governments without
required revenue powers make them dependent on national
governments for financing their expenditure responsibilities. When a
substantial part of revenue at provincial level comes as
intergovernmental transfers, it is important to look at the transfer
system through a gender lens. The constitution has established the
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) and entrusted it with a
variety of powers related to intergovernmental fiscal relations.
In principle, the central objective of the intergovernmental
fiscal transfer system is to offset fiscal disabilities arising from
Chart 1: Distribution (%) of Persons 























deficiency in revenue capacity and higher unit cost of providing public
services in the case of general purpose transfers and ensuring
minimum standards of services in case of specific purpose transfers.
The case for integrating gender component into general purpose
transfers is a matter of debate. Apparently, the general purpose
transfers in South Africa designed on cost norms to meet the needs
of assigned expenditure functions, especially education and health,
may incorporate gender disaggregated indicators as well, and assign
appropriate weights. In the case of health, it is not the population with
or without medical aid facilities that seems relevant for determining
the equitable share of provinces.  Although the population in general
is the beneficiary of healthcare, the requirement of healthcare
facilities is greater for certain categories of population, particularly
important for small children (less than 5 years), elderly (more than 65
years) and women in the reproductive age group, and therefore it
may be useful to redesign the health component of the formula by
including these factors (FFC, 2004). Similarly, educating girls may
have different cost implications from educating boys. On the other
hand, it is argued that gender considerations need not be integrated
into the general purpose transfers which are mainly to offset the
vertical and horizontal inequities in fiscal capacity. However, gender
considerations may be integrated in specific purpose transfers as
they are meant to ensure minimum standards of merit services in all
jurisdictions.
Yet another point to be flagged is the implication of shifting
the welfare component from the ambit of PES into the conditional
grants segment. One of the main reasons behind this amendment is
the arbitrary crowding out of other constitutionally mandated basic
social services (CMBSS) in social sector budgets because of the
rising social security expenditure.
10 Far from resulting in trivial
variations from actual expenditure, these differ considerably from
what the results of the National Treasury formula suggest these
allocations should be. This strongly suggested that social security
grants need to be treated differently within the budget allocation
process to avoid crowding out (FFC, 2003).
The gender implication of reverting the social security grants
to the national level, to avoid crowding out of the other provincial
service delivery mandates, is yet another matter of concern. This
component of PES has two elements.  The first weighs transfer
payments to identified groups namely, the elderly, disabled and
children.  The weights for the target population groups is determined
according to the historical distribution of expenditure on different
grants.  The second element is the population in the lowest two21
quintiles of income distribution determined on the basis of the latest
income and expenditure survey. Since poor and elderly black women
are likely to have disproportionately high representation among
recipients of social development grants such as old age pensions,
and are also likely to be relatively more numerous in the bottom
deciles of the income distribution, this recent change in the rules of
fiscal transfer will have positive gender implications because the
nature of grants now is not untied and hence not fungible.
IV. Budgetary Process and Gender at
Provincial and Local Government
Conceptually, gender budgeting can be operationalised at
two stages; one at the ex-ante levels in the process of making
budgets and two, at ex-post levels looking at the budget document
through a gender lens and impact analysis or looking at outcome and
outputs in terms of gender. This section deals with the budgetary
processes at provincial and local level governments to identify the ex-
ante entry points for gender in terms of making the budgets.
4.1 Provincial Budgetary Process
At the onset, it is to be mentioned that the provincial budget
needs to be approved by the national treasury and the autonomy of
the provincial budgets is limited to that extent. Moreover, as noted in
the above section, decentralisation is not effective at provincial level
owing to their negligible revenue powers.
The chief goal of the provincial budget process is to translate
the derived provincial priorities into departmental budgets within the
parameters of Public Finance Management Act and
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act. In the first cycle, the
provincial treasury requests departments to draft budgets and
strategic plans on the basis of provincial and national government
policies and these submitted drafts are assessed by the provincial
treasury through a series of bilateral meetings with departments.
These assessments are supported by a series of reviews
subsequently consolidated into a Provincial Medium Term Budget
Policy Statement
11 (MTBPS 2005-2008). The first cycle ends when
MTBPS is accepted by the provincial cabinet and tabled in the
provincial parliament. The second starts when departments are
requested to refine their draft budgets and strategic plans provided in22
MTBPS. After the amendments, the final budget proposals are
forwarded to the executive. After the process is ratified by the
provincial cabinet and as the strategies come to the point of
finalisation, the monitoring of the implementation on a quarterly basis
begins through mutually reinforcing processes led by Department of
Premier and Provincial Treasury.
4.2  Provincial Gender Budgeting Experiences
In terms of gender budgeting, not all the provinces have
initiated the process within government.  Gauteng Provincial
government set off gender budgeting in 2003 as a result of a
collaborative venture of Social Development Directorate of the
Premier’s Office and the Gauteng Department of Finance and
Economic Affairs. The Budget Review, 2003 of Gauteng contained
sections on gender, where it explained the mainstreaming approach
of the province in terms of gender budgeting and its focus on
economic empowerment in particular. It is also noted that each
department has been asked to look at outcomes and outputs of
different programmes in terms of three categories:
• Those which are specifically targeted for women and girls.
• Those which benefit women or promote equality although they
might be used by both men and women.
• Those which benefit women employees of the Gauteng provincial
government (GPG).
Departments were also asked to provide a gender
breakdown of their employees and targets in terms of procurement
from women-owned businesses. Budget Overview notes that the
Gauteng Provincial Government views this as an incremental
process aiming towards a full fledged gender budget.
12
It is also to be noted that Gauteng legislature produced a
gender budget policy document, which indicated how gender
budgeting could fit into the Programme Evaluation and Budget
Analysis (PEBA) model developed by the legislature, piloted in three
sectors, viz., education, housing and safety and liaison.
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4.3 Local Level Budgeting Process, IDP and Gender
At the local level, since 1996, Integrated Development
Planning (IDP) was made mandatory to ensure that the budget is
aligned with the priorities of the municipality’s development priorities.
IDP was a crucial step to move away from apartheid planning which23
created racially divided geographical areas, increasing informal
settlements and in turn poor provisioning of public services. Municipal
Systems Act (Act 32, 2000) defines IDP as a “single, inclusive and
strategic plan” that links, integrates and coordinates a municipal
sector specific plans; aligns the resources and capacity of the
municipality to the overall development objectives of the municipality,
forms the policy framework on which annual budgets rest and informs
and is informed by similar development plans at national and
provincial development plans. The Municipal Finance Management
Bill (2002) also requires municipalities to consider IDP in the drafting
of the budget and ensure that the budget is aligned with the priorities
of the municipality’s IDP. The different phases of IDP and methods of
participation are given in Table 7.
Table 7: Stages of Integrated Development Plan (IDP)
Planning phase Methods for Participation
I Analysis • Community meetings organised by the ward councilor
• Stakeholder meetings
• Surveys and opinion polls (getting views on how people feel




Public debates on what can work best in solving a problem
Meetings with affected communities and stakeholders
Representation of stakeholders on project subcommittees
III Integration IDP Representative Forum






The first two stages of IDP identify the local needs, prioritise
it and develop the medium term development strategy to achieve its
development objectives, which in turn leads to the identification of
specific projects. Once all projects have been identified, in the third
stage, municipalities critically review the projects to see whether they
provide an overall picture of the development plans. The final stage
of the IDP integrates all the strategies for issues like poverty
alleviation, disaster management, HIV-AIDS with overall IDP and
submits the overall IDP for approval before the Council. The Council
may adopt a draft for public comment before it is finalised.
As it is structured, there is community participation in the
development of IDP and municipal budgets, which in turn provides an
opportunity to the citizens to identify the local needs in terms of
gender and involvement in the process of prioritisation. In particular,
the IDP Representative Forum includes representatives from
unorganised groups including those working on gender.
14  In a study24
on gender budgeting at local level in South Africa, it is noted that the
local councillors were better informed on the gender structures in IDP
as well as on the details of the budget consultation process.
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However, in general the local councillors had a technical approach to
the matters such as non-availability of gender disaggregated data for
such analysis or relevance of the assumption of household as the
unit of analysis, rather than gender.
IDP can be an effective entry point to conduct ex-ante
gender budgeting by identifying the gender needs at the local level,
cost it and subsequently building it into budgets. This alternative
model of gender budgeting from the existing traditional models of ex-
post gender budgeting of looking into existing budgets through a
gender lens and categorising the allocations on the basis of intensity
of gender allocations can go far with the strengthening of fiscal
decentralisation in South Africa.
V. Gender in Governance at Local Level
An area in which substantial progress has been made in
South Africa in the post-apartheid regime consists of advancing the
role of women in governance at all tiers of government. Against the
backdrop of gender equality and non-racial discrimination, the South
African government has set clear targets towards the empowerment
of women in terms of participation at the level of legislature, senior
management positions in public sector, and at local government
level. Within the framework of the White paper on the Transformation
of the Public Service, 1995 and the White Paper of Affirmative Action
in Public Services, 1998, a minimum target of 30 percent was put in
place for women in management positions in the public service.  In
national Parliament, as of 2004, almost a third (32.75%) of members
of the national Assembly are women. There were 22 (44.89%) female
ministers and deputy ministers at national level in 2004.  There has
been an 18 percent increase of women in National Legislature since
1997. Four of the nine premiers of provinces since 2004 elections
have been women.  Before the 2004 elections, Free State was the
only province to have been consistently headed by women premiers.
The present level of representation of women within Provincial
Legislature is 32.3 percent. Seven out of nine provinces have met the
minimum 30 percent quota for women in political and decision-
making positions. The existence of 284 elected local councils in
South Africa, a country of 43 million people, does bring the
government relatively close to the population. Thus local25
governments in South Africa come much closer to fitting the concept
of ‘self governance’ than do the provincial governments (Momoniat,
2002).
South African National Gender Machinery operates on three
pillars:  (i) Parliamentary Structures of the Women’s Caucus and the
Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Quality of Life and Status of
Women; (ii) The Office of the Status of Women, based in the Office of
the Presidency and working closely with gender desks in line with
ministries; and (iii) the Commission for Gender Equality, an
independent advisory, consultative and research body, which is
directly accountable to parliament. Gender Commissioners are
appointed for all provinces. At the local level, the Traditional
Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003 (Act 41 of 2003)
requires that at least 30 percent members of the National House of
Traditional Leaders be women.
16 In 2003, women comprised 28
percent of councillors at local government level. This marked a
significant increase from 16.9 percent in 2002. The moot question is
whether the participation of women in local government has led to
integration of gender analysis in the programming and service
delivery. The rationale for gender sensitive budgeting is that local
governments, which are closer to citizens, have high probability of
better information on the gender differentiated needs and
preferences, options and constraints of citizens. Hence more efficient
provisioning of public services can be ensured at local level than at
the national government. Moreover, as the local governments raise
most of their revenues from own sources, their councillors might be
seen as more accountable to their constituents than are officials of
the provinces where most financing comes from the national
government as intergovernmental transfers. Effective participation of
women in governance at local government along with the fiscal
autonomy at local level in South Africa may be able to change the
expenditure decisions of the local government and in turn change the
types of public good investments at local level to reflect the revealed
preferences of women.
VI. Conclusion
Reviewing the developments in the post-apartheid regime,
the paper looks into the process of fiscal decentralisation through a
gender lens to identify entry points for gender in the local governance
and budgeting process. Though initiatives on gender budgeting were
undertaken at the Department of Finance at national level, they were
rolled back in 1999 after two years of donor-driven initiatives.26
However, it would not be fair to say that gender budgeting has since
been completely given up in South Africa. Rather to say that gender
budgeting initiatives in South Africa is more of a civil society (outside
government) initiative rather than within government initiative. South
African experience also highlights that the donor-driven gender
budgeting initiatives are unsustainable and fail institutionalisation.
This is corroborated by many experiences across the globe.  The civil
society (outside government) initiative of gender budgeting has its
advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of civil society
(outside government) initiative of WBI in South Africa have been
participatory, grassroot initiatives by the civil society to provide
economic literacy among ordinary people and to demystify the
budgets for them through the publication of simple budget (sectoral)
booklets through a gender lens.  However the drawback of the WBI is
that it failed to institutionalise gender budget within government in
South Africa. The sustainability of gender budgeting initiatives in
South Africa will depend to a great extent in creating synergy
between the civil society and government, in particular, with experts
in budget division of finance, to further strengthen the public finance
lens of gender budgeting in South Africa.
With the progress of fiscal decentralisation and policies
related to affirmative action, South Africa seeks to address gender
inequalities in various ways. As you now, there are no visible signs of
gender budgeting within the government at national or subnational
levels in a sustained manner.  To start with, gender thrusts in the
government had been confined to the gender inequality issues of
elites in civil services rather than for the poor and needy black
women. There is however, an increasing trend towards
mainstreaming gender in budgets and affirmative action rather than
allocating separate policies and programmes for women.
Furthermore, gender is now intrinsic in legislations for employment
equity, black economic empowerment and violence against women.
What makes the South African gender-oriented actions different from
other countries is the interface between racial discrimination and
gender inequalities.
At the local level gender initiative began in South Africa in
1999. At the second tier of government, poor fiscal autonomy of
provinces has significant adverse implications in terms of gender
budgeting, especially since they are responsible for the
implementation of the most important social services, including
school education, health and housing. The asymmetry between the
revenue powers and expenditure functions across levels made
subnational governments dependent on the transfers from national27
government. Integrating gender component into intergovernmental
transfers is a matter of debate. On the one hand, it is felt that as the
design of equitable share transfers (unconditional) are based on cost
norms designed to meet the needs of assigned expenditure
functions, especially in terms of education and health, it may
incorporate gender disaggregated indicators as well, and assign
appropriate weights to them.  On the other hand, it is argued that
gender considerations need not be integrated into the general
purpose transfers which is mainly to offset the horizontal inequities in
fiscal capacity. However, gender considerations may be integrated in
specific purpose transfers as they are meant to ensure minimum
standards of merit services in all jurisdictions.
In terms of gender, provisioning of public goods and user
services like water (which is primarily the responsibility of the local
governments) assumes importance. Time use statistics of South
Africa provide valuable insights in terms of gender in these
expenditure assignments, which otherwise would appear to be non-
rival in nature. It provides information in identifying the
complementary fiscal services. Better public provisioning of water
can have positive social externalities in terms of educating the girl
child and improving the health and nutritional aspects of the
household in general.
Greater fiscal autonomy with effective participation of women
in governance at lower levels may change the expenditure decisions
of the local government through the various types of public good
investments to corresponding more revealed preferences (‘voice’) of
women. The linking of Integrated Development Planning (IDP) in the
budgetary process that is now taking place, has the potential of
bringing gender explicitly in public policy.31
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Endnotes
                                                       
1 The white population constitutes only 4.4 million (9.3%), the coloured (that
is, ‘mixed’) population 4.1 million (8.8%) and India/Asian 1.1 million (2.5%) as
per midyear estimates for 2005. Fifty one percent (23.8 million) of the
population are women (Statistics South Africa, 2005).
2 The legacy of apartheid left wide spatial inequalities along racial lines with
four racially segregated white provinces and nine black ‘homelands’.
Homelands were fiscally dependent at the national government of the
apartheid regime.  Post-apartheid, moves towards decentralisation began
with reorganising the country under nine new provinces. During the apartheid
regime, white ruled South Africa was divided into four provincial
administrations appointed by the national government and local
governments. Black South Africans were confined to live in ‘homelands’
established in rural areas away from the main centres. Black people living in
urban townships in South Africa then were regarded as temporary residents
had to move to the homelands once term of labour was over. The budget of
apartheid government focussed spending on white residents, with very little
expenditure directed towards education, health, housing and other basic
needs of black residents (Momoniat, 2002). Subsequently, a decentralised
system with three levels of government was created and a mandate for fiscal
division of powers and provisioning of public services was defined for each
tier in the constitution. With more effective policies related to affirmative
action and fiscal decentralisation, there is an increasing recognition of the
need for mainstreaming gender in the budget rather than implementing
separate women’s programmes and policies. The initiatives on gender
budgeting cannot however be viewed in isolation from the ongoing process
of integrating gender in other policy initiatives in South Africa. The most
important among the initiatives have been the attempt to incorporate gender
dimension in the legislative measures designed to end discrimination against
the native people, viz., Employment Equity Act, Promotion of Equality Act,
Black Economic Empowerment act (BEE) etc. For details, section 2.
3 The parliamentary partner was initially the Joint Standing Committee on
Finance and later the Joint Committee on the Quality of Life and Status of
Women. The two NGOs involved in the process were the Institute of
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Community Agency for Social
Enquiry (CASE).
4 The approach of ‘mainstreaming gender’ in macropolicies is criticised on
the ground that it may lead to non-transparency and non-accountability of
gender in the process of mainstreaming. (from the interview  with  Mary,
Gender Equity Unit, University of Cape Town).
5 Since 1996, WBI produced a series of books each year, viz., First Women’s
Budget (1996), Second Women’s Budget (1997), Third Women’s Budget
(1998), Fourth Women’s Budget (1999), Fifth Women’s Budget (2000), Sixth
Women’s Budget (2001).
6  The Constitution of South Africa states in section 214:
"214. (1) An Act of Parliament must provide for
• The equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national,
provincial and local spheres of    government;29
                                                                                                                     
• The determination of each province's equitable share of the provincial
share of that revenue; and
• Any other allocations to provinces, local government or municipalities
from the national government's share of that revenue, and any
conditions on which those allocations may be made.”
The distribution of the equitable share must take into account ‘the need to
ensure that… municipalities are able to provide basic services and the
functions allocated to them’ (sub-section 2d) ‘the fiscal capacity and
efficiency of…municipalities’, (sub-section 2e) and the ‘developmental and
other needs of…municipalities’ (subsection 2f).
7 FFC (2004) gives some of the reasons for the revision of the PES formula,
which are as follows:
(i) The current formula has now been fully phased in.
(ii) The latest census data has been available since 2003. The current
weights assigned to different components of the formula are heavily
driven by demographic patterns and hence need to be assessed.
(iii) The national government is going to establish the South African Social
Security Agency (SASSA) which will be responsible for the payment of
social security grants. The welfare component of the PES will therefore
cease to exist and will be converted into a conditional grant.
(iv) Existence of the backlog component inspired provinces to increase
their capital spending on basic services, which might have proved
unsustainable in the long run.
(v) Although the allocations of provinces are determined in terms of the
seven components, provinces have the discretion to spend their
equitable share transfers according to their own priorities since the
allocation is unconditional. This gives rise to a potential situation of
provinces bypassing developmental expenditure.
(vi) Provinces have now been given additional taxation and borrowing
powers. This calls for lowering the weight assigned to the economic
activity component.
(vii) The welfare component being removed, it needs to be replaced by
another component that addresses the redistribution issue.
8 ISRDP stands for Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme
while URP stands for Urban Renewal Programme.
9 For details, refer Rao, 2003.
10 In the 2001 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, the weight for the welfare
component is increased by one percentage point and the weight for the
economic component decreased by one percentage point. This increase in
social security expenditure represents the full funding of a national mandate
with no provincial discretion. However, no adjustment occurs to the overall
allocation to provincial government to reflect this changing mandate. Other
social service expenditures are therefore a residual allocation after the full
funding of social security. Social security grants are therefore incorrectly
specified in the equitable share formula.
11 These reviews include Provincial Economic Review and Outlook, a Service
Delivery Review, a Review of Local Government and a Review of Financial
Governance and all these reviews.30
                                                                                                                     
12 The departments that included a gender element within their statements
were: Office of the Premier, Health, Development Planning and Local
Government, Public Transport, Roads and Works, Safety and Liaison,
Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs, Sports, Recreation,
Arts and Culture. Gauteng Shared Services included three paragraphs on
“gender, BEE and Employment creation issues”. For details, refer
Commission on Gender Equality, 2004.
13 For details, refer Commission on Gender Equality, 2004.
14 The other members of the IDP Representative Forum are executive
committee of the council, Councilors including district councilors, traditional
leaders, ward committee representative, heads of departments and senior
officials from municipal and government department, representatives from
organised stakeholder groups, resource people or advisors and community
representatives.
15 Commission of Gender Equality (2004): ‘Gender Budgeting in Local
Government’, http:/www.cge.org.za/ for further details, refer ‘Beijing Plus Ten
Report’, Office of Status of Women, South Africa, 2005.
16 
Provincial legislation provides for mechanisms or procedures to allow a
sufficient number of women to be represented in the Provincial House of
Traditional Leaders, and be elected as representatives to the National House
of Traditional Leaders. The Act also requires that the number of women be
representatives of the traditional leaders within a district or municipality. The
Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000), ensures
the development of a culture that promotes participatory governance and
creates enabling conditions to achieve this. Municipalities are required to
take into account the circumstances of women, people with disabilities and
the youth in development planning through specific processes. The Local
Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998), makes provision for equal
representation of women and men in political party lists and ward
committees. Ward committees have the power and functions to make
recommendations and influence decisions on any matter affecting the lives of
all people in municipal wards. The South African Local Government
Association’s (SALGA) Gender working group was also formed in 1996, in
order to ensure the strategic presence of women and gender issues in local
government.